The tariff fight is entering a decisive phase. On Aug. 29, a federal appeals court ruled that President Trump went beyond his authority by using emergency powers (IEEPA) to impose broad tariffs on U.S. imports. The decision is on hold until Oct. 14, giving the administration time to appeal, but it now heads toward a likely showdown at the Supreme Court.
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Even if those powers are curbed, tariffs won’t disappear. Congress has long delegated substantial authority to the executive branch. This delegation began in earnest with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, passed under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which allowed the White House to negotiate trade deals and adjust tariffs by up to 50% without returning to Capitol Hill for approval. F.D.R. used this authority to ink over 30 bilateral agreements, reshaping global trade amid the Great Depression. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, under President John F. Kennedy, introduced Section 232, empowering the president to impose tariffs on imports that threaten national security following a Department of Commerce investigation. Similarly, the Trade Act of 1974’s Section 301 authorizes retaliatory measures, including tariffs, against unfair foreign trade practices. And the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (I.E.E.P.A.) grants even broader leeway during declared national emergencies to regulate international economic transactions.
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Trump’s first term built on this legacy, using Sections 232 and 301, along with I.E.E.P.A., to levy tariffs on steel (25%), aluminum (10%), and vast swaths of Chinese goods—actions that courts largely upheld as within statutory bounds. His successor, Joe Biden, not only retained these tariffs but escalated them in 2024 on Chinese electric vehicle batteries and solar cells, pushing rates over 100% in some cases under the same Section 301 authority.
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Ronald Reagan, the conservative icon, invoked Section 301 in the 1980s to hit Japanese motorcycles with a 100% tariff (later scaled back) and semiconductors with similar measures to combat dumping and intellectual property theft. George W. Bush safeguarded the steel industry in 2002 with tariffs up to 30% under the Trade Act’s provisions. Even Barack Obama, hardly a protectionist, imposed up to 35% tariffs on Chinese tires in 2009 to shield domestic manufacturers from surges in imports. So while the basis for the latest tariffs from Trump may not hold up in court, there are myriad other legal bases from which to place them in effect.

Who Stands to Gain or Lose
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Potential winners if IEEPA tariffs are curtailed:
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• Big-box retailers (Walmart, Amazon): Lower import costs improve margins and pricing power.
• Consumers: Relief in tariff-heavy goods would soften prices in select categories.
• Exporters in ASEAN, Brazil, and India: With fewer blanket tariffs, trade flows could recover.
• Equity markets: A ruling that reins in executive power may be seen as a stabilizing outcome for investors.
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Likely losers:

• U.S. bond market: Weaker tariff revenues expand deficits, adding pressure to already heavy Treasury issuance.
• Strategic sectors (chips, EVs, steel, pharmaceuticals): Narrower tariffs remain likely, keeping costs elevated.
• Shipping and logistics firms: More fragmented trade policy means shifting compliance burdens and higher unpredictability.
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Geopolitical angle: China could gain indirectly. A weaker U.S. negotiating position and diverted supply chains through ASEAN provide Beijing with breathing room. Some analysts are already floating the idea of a limited trade arrangement — a “Phase 1.5” — to pause escalation in exchange for selective tariff relief.